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TOO EXPENSIVE TO TREAT? NON-TREATMENT DECISIONS AT THE MARGINS OF 
VIABILITY 






This article seeks to challenge the assumption that it is legitimate to consider the costs of premature 
babies’ future social and educational needs when deciding what treatment, if any, to provide in the 
NICU. It questions the elision that is made between the claim that a particular treatment is insufficiently 
cost-effective, and the claim that a person will be a burden on the state in the future. It discusses a series 
of common misunderstandings about how treatment decisions are taken in the neonatal intensive care 
unit, and concludes by suggesting that the claim that premature babies are too expensive to treat may 









Ten years ago, the latest EPIcure study appeared to show that 24 weeks’ gestation had become a fairly 
stable marker for viability in babies born prematurely.1 Survival rates without major disability had 
improved considerably for babies born at 24 and 25 weeks, while survival rates for babies born at 22 and 
23 weeks had scarcely improved at all, and continued to be very low indeed. More recently, there has 
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been evidence of marked improvements in the survival rates of babies born at 23, and even 22 weeks.2 
This new data has provoked discussion around two different questions: the legitimacy of the 24 week 
abortion time limit and the costs of very premature babies, immediately after birth and, if they survive, 
during their lifetimes. Although we mention abortion in passing later, our focus in this article is instead 
on this second issue, namely concern about the ‘affordability’ of babies born at the margins of viability. 
 A recent article in The Times, for example, reporting a ‘boom’ in survival rates for babies born at 
23 weeks,3 emphasised how much these babies cost. The article conflates two costs: the cost of treating 
these children at the start of their lives and the cost of the care that children who survive with mild, 
moderate or severe disabilities may require in the future.4 Eight years ago, the cost to the NHS of care in 
the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), coupled with the costs of premature babies’ ongoing medical 
and educational needs was estimated to be almost one billion pounds.5 Given rising numbers of 
extremely premature babies, and the other pressures on health and special educational needs (SEN) 
services, it is not uncommon for academic and media commentators to question whether some 
premature babies might be ‘too expensive to treat’.6  
  Media interest in extremely preterm infants, defined as babies born before 28 completed weeks 
of pregnancy, is understandable.7  The NICU combines advanced technology and sophisticated medical 
skill, with the human interest of sometimes miraculous outcomes, and stunned, grateful or grieving 
parents. Even if we are familiar with images of the NICU from the television, it remains a profoundly 
alien environment. Impossibly tiny babies are contained within plastic incubators or isolettes, their 
miniscule bodies hooked up to diagnostic machines; intubated and/or sustained by oxygen delivery 
devices that can hide their faces; monitored by lines and screens that bleep and display myriad figures 
and graphs. Sometimes babies are lit to help with jaundice and sometimes they are blindfolded to avoid 
damage to eyes that are not yet open. This world is hushed and urgent, purposive but also a world of 
stasis and uncertainty, and one that is intensely ‘other’ to the noise and activity of a normal labour ward.  
The uncanny appearance of these miniature infants, viewed behind clear plastic, in what looks more like 
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4 See also J Marcus, ‘The test ahead’ Boston Globe, October 9, 2011. 
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(2009) 123 Pediatrics e312-27; K Devlin, ‘Premature births cost the NHS almost £1 billion a year’ The Telegraph, 2 May 2009. 
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Infants’ (1983) 307 New England Journal of Medicine 1330-133. 
7 See, for example, J Laurence, ‘Extremely Premature Babies: “we wondered if it was right to let him live”’ The Independent, 12 




a laboratory or a spaceship than a hospital ward, converts them into objects of curiosity and wonder.8  
But while extremely premature babies may not look like other sick children, we intend to argue that this 
does not justify adopting a different approach to decisions about whether to withhold or withdraw life-
prolonging treatment from them. 
In addition to concern about the cost of treating extremely premature babies, there are also those 
who worry that, through facilitating their survival, science might be ‘pushing the limits of nature too 
far’.9 This sort of argument is a familiar response to novel medical technologies. It has been made 
recently in relation to mitochondrial replacement techniques,10 and it is worth remembering that Bob 
Edwards and Patrick Steptoe faced opposition to their research into IVF by those who argued that 
infertility only affected a small number of people, and that the more pressing problem was 
overpopulation.11  Just because technological progress can enable babies to survive at 22 or 23 weeks, 
some would question whether it should always be used. Andrew Jameton, for example, has argued that 
NICUs should be shut down so that we no longer ‘invest our social resources in such an extravagant and 
unbalanced way’.12 More moderately, Neera Bhatia concludes that ‘[t]here is a need for a critical re-
evaluation of the intersection between what health outcomes can be achieved using advanced medical 
technology and what outcomes should be achieved.’13  
 In this article, we seek to challenge the assumption that it is legitimate to consider the costs of 
premature babies’ future social and educational needs when deciding what treatment, if any, to provide 
in the NICU. This is not because we think the NICU ought to be a rationing-free zone, to which 
limitless funds could, or should be made available. As a threshold matter, we point out that NICU care is 
often surprisingly cost-effective. More fundamentally, we question the elision that is made between the 
claim that a particular treatment, such as resuscitation, is insufficiently cost-effective, and the claim that a 
person will be a burden on the state in the future. Next, we will suggest that the claim that some babies 
are too young, and hence too costly to treat is based upon a series of fundamental misunderstandings 
about both gestational age and the reality of decision-making in the NICU. On this, we agree with 
Manya Hendriks and John Lantos’ recent conclusion that ‘[t]he promulgation and use of policies that 
rely primarily on gestational age seems to be unscientific, inexplicable, and unjust’.14 
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10 F Baylis, ‘Human Nuclear Genome Transfer (So-Called Mitochondrial Replacement): Clearing the Underbrush’ (2017) 31 
Bioethics 7–19.  
11 MH Johnson, SB Franklin, M Cottingham and N Hopwood, ‘Why the Medical Research Council refused Robert Edwards 
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12 Quoted in JD Lantos, review of RL Guyer, Baby at Risk: The Uncertain Legacies of Medical Miracles for Babies, Families, and Society 
(2007) 7 American Journal of Bioethics 45-46. 
13 Neera Bhatia, Critically Impaired Infants and End of Life Decision Making:  Resource Allocation and Difficult Decisions (London and 
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Finally, and in conclusion, we argue that infants born at the margins of viability appear to be 
located in a morally-ambiguous zone, in which their gestational age can be invoked in order to allow the 
granting or withholding of life itself.  We suggest that the claim that premature babies are too expensive 
to treat may depend upon regarding a premature infant as if she were not yet a person, with rights and 
interests of her own. Unlike Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer’s controversial 1985 book which maintained 
that it could be legitimate to kill ‘handicapped’ infants precisely because they are infants,15 many of those 
who worry about the costs of premature babies’ future care do not intend to treat them as less than fully 
human. But it is unimaginable in any other context that treatment would be withheld from a person 
because that person might impose costs upon the state in the future. If a premature infant’s moral and 
legal status is instead equivalent to that of a fetus, this sort of argument makes more sense. While a fetus 
is in utero, its life can be terminated because the child, if born, would impose costs and burdens on 
others. After birth, once a baby has an existence separate from her mother, treatment decisions should 
be taken in the same way as they are for other children. This, we argue, would rule out withholding 




II  AN ODD WAY TO RATION TREATMENT 
We certainly do not intend to argue that cost-effectiveness analysis has no place in the NICU, and that 
unlimited resources should be diverted away from other parts of the NHS in order to fund expensive 
neonatology services. On the contrary, we accept that rationing is inevitable, and the task therefore is to 
ensure that it is carried out as fairly and transparently as possible.16 In the NICU, this means that new 
drugs and technologies should be introduced and funded only if they meet a threshold level of cost-
effectiveness.  
The most commonly-used mechanism through which the cost-effectiveness of medical 
interventions is assessed is the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY).17 QALYs measure both the amount 
of life years generated by a treatment, and their quality, and their purpose is to prioritise treatments that 
offer the longest periods of healthy and active life at the lowest cost.18 In the UK, although QALYs are 
not the only relevant consideration, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has 
                                                 
15 H Kuhse and P Singer, Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985). 
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Maynard, ‘Ethics and health care “underfunding”’ (2001) 27 Journal of Medical Ethics 223–7, Bhatia (n 13). 
17 A Williams, ‘The value of QALYs’ (1985) 94 Health and Social Service Journal 3. 




employed a cost-effectiveness threshold of between £20,000 and £30,000 per QALY.19 Using QALYs as 
a benchmark, care in the NICU appears to be cost-effective. Writing seven years ago, John Lantos and 
William Meadow explained that: 
neonatal intensive care units are among the most cost-effective of all intensive care interventions. In fact, 
they are more cost-effective than coronary artery bypass surgery or renal dialysis. Most analyses estimate 
that NICU care costs well under $10,000 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY). Some analyses put the 
number at closer to $5000/QALY.20 
 
At first sight, this comparatively low cost-per-QALY of treatment in the NICU might look 
surprising. But, as Hendriks and Lantos have explained, the costs of treatment in the NICU are 
concentrated in the first weeks of a baby’s life.21 Babies who die in the NICU tend to die soon after 
birth, whereas many of the babies who survive will have normal, healthy lifespans. Hence, as Hendriks 
and Lantos explain, ‘most expenses in the NICU are directed to babies who will ultimately survive and 
do well’.22 On average, the cost-per-QALY is therefore low. In contrast, in adult intensive care units, the 
majority of resources are spent on adults who die soon afterwards,23 which inevitably makes the cost-
per-QALY much higher.  
While rationing in the NICU according to cost-per-QALY cost-effectiveness analysis is normal 
and unexceptional, when the claim is made that a baby may be too premature, and, as a result, too 
expensive to treat, this is rationing according to how expensive it might be to care for the person treated 
in the future. This would not normally be a relevant consideration when making rationing decisions. 
Of course, because rationing means that that some patients will not receive treatment that would 
benefit them (otherwise, the decision not to treat would be an instance of clinical judgement, rather than 
rationing), there are indubitably other patients from whom potentially life-saving treatment is withheld 
on cost grounds. When NICE decides not to approve a new cancer drug for use in the NHS, because it 
is insufficiently cost-effective, there may be identifiable patients who will suffer, and perhaps die as a 
result.24 But the decision in such cases is that drug X is too expensive, because the cost-per-QALY is too 
high, not that patient Y, if she survives, is likely to be too expensive to look after in the future.  
The implication of rationing according to the costs of the patient’s future care is that, in some 
cases, her non-life, or death, might be cheaper and therefore more cost-effective for the NHS. It is 
                                                 
19 A Dillon, ‘Carrying NICE over the threshold’ (NICE, 2015). 
20 JD Lantos and WL Meadow, ‘Costs and End-of-Life Care in the NICU: Lessons for the MICU?’ (2011) 39 The Journal of 
Law, Medicine & Ethics 194-200. 
21 Hendriks and Lantos (n 14). 
22 Ibid 
23 JD Lantos, M Mokalla and W Meadow, ‘Resource allocation in neonatal and medical ICUs: epidemiology and rationing at 
the extremes of life’ (1997) 156 American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 185-189. 
24 J Raftery, ‘NICE and the challenge of cancer drugs’ (2009) 338 British Medical Journal (online). 
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unimaginable that cancer services, or emergency or intensive care services would be rationed on the 
grounds that the death of expensive-to-treat people is more economically efficient for the NHS than 
their survival. If a child were to suffer a severe brain injury which would leave her completely dependent 
on others for the rest of her life, the costs of her future care are likely to be very high indeed, but this 
would not be treated as a relevant factor when deciding whether to withhold or withdraw life-saving 
treatment from her. Rather the paramount decision-making criterion in such cases is the individual 
child’s best interests.25 
In the following section, we will query the use of gestational age as predictor of success, but it is 
also worth noting that rationing on the grounds of gestational age might be said to be contrary to basic 
principles of fairness in rationing.  At the other end of the human lifespan, it would be unthinkable to 
withhold life-sustaining treatment from everyone over a certain age, on the grounds that they will become 
costly to care for in the future. Of course, there are those who would say that there is a rational reason 
for making just such a distinction between the very elderly and the very young.26 An elderly person has a 
history and a biography, and may be living a life that she values. In contrast, a premature newborn is 
unaware of anything other than physical sensations like warmth, touch, and hunger. She does not have a 
sense of self, and is unable yet to place a value on her own life.27  We return below to the question of 
whether this should affect the value that society places upon her life. 
 
III HOW ARE TREATMENT DECISIONS MADE IN THE NICU? 
Once a child is born alive,  the law which covers the medical treatment of children applies. Of course, 
this requires us to be able to tell when a child has been born alive, and, as Achas Burin has pointed out, 
this is not necessarily straightforward.28 The ‘born alive’ test for legal personhood was not developed in 
order to articulate the necessary conditions of personhood, rather, its purpose was, in the criminal law, 
to establish whether, at the time of alleged criminal conduct which was said to cause the death of a 
‘child’, the child would have lived but for the defendant’s act.29 In the UK, a child is said to be born alive 
                                                 
25 Children Act 1989 section 1(1). See, for example, Yates and Gard v Great Ormond Street Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2017] 
EWCA Civ 410; Evans v Alder Hey Trust [2018] EWCA 984 (Civ). 
26 J Harris, ‘Human Beings, Persons and Conjoined Twins: An Ethical Analysis of the Judgment in Re A’ (2001) 9 Medical 
Law Review 221–36. 
27 SA Sayeed, ‘Futility in the NICU: my life without me’ in H Colt, S Quadrelli and F Lester (eds), The Picture of Health: Medical 
Ethics and the Movies (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011) Part 9, chapter 6. 
28 AK Burin ‘Beyond Pragmatism: Defending the “Bright Line” of Birth’ (2014) 22 Medical Law Review 494-525. 
29 K Savell, (2006) ‘Is the “born alive” rule outdated and indefensible?’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 625-664. 
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if it can breathe through a ventilator,30 or ‘through its lungs alone’,31 but not if it derives ‘any of its living 
or power of living by or through any connection with its mother’.32  
In practice, if a baby is capable of being resuscitated in the delivery room, she has been born 
alive and her parents acquire the right to take decisions about her medical treatment,33 subject to being 
overruled by the courts if the decision they wish to take is not in their child’s best interests.34 If a child’s 
parents refuse to consent to treatment that the doctors believe to be in her best interests, the NHS Trust 
can apply to the court for a declaration that treatment would be lawful.35 Or, if the treating team believe 
that it would not be in a child’s best interests to receive futile or burdensome treatment, but the parents 
want treatment to continue,36 or want their child to receive experimental treatment against medical 
advice,37 the NHS Trust can apply for a declaration that it would be lawful to withdraw or withhold 
treatment. As with adults, the courts can declare that treatment, or non-treatment, would be lawful, in a 
child’s best interests, but they will not force doctors to act contrary to their clinical judgement.38 
There is now a significant body of cases in which decisions about whether to withhold or 
withdraw life-prolonging treatment from a gravely ill child have come before the courts,39 but none of 
these cases has involved an extremely premature baby in the NICU. In part, this is a question of timing. 
Decisions in the NICU often have to be taken quickly, and there may be good reasons not to delay 
decision-making in order that the child’s situation can be subject to expert evaluation and thorough legal 
argument. But the lack of time for lengthy legal proceedings cannot be the whole story. There are 
mechanisms which enable ex parte court decisions to be made quickly in an emergency, but these do not 
tend to be employed in relation to life and death decisions in the NICU.40 Instead, it seems that, aside 
from the wholly exceptional conjoined twins case in 2001,41 neither parents nor doctors in the NICU are 
                                                 
30 Per Sir John Donaldson MR, C v S [1988] QB 135, at 151, 
31 Per Brooke J, Rance v Mid-Downs HA [1991] 1 QB 587 at 621.  
32 Ibid 
33 Anyone with parental responsibility for a child can give consent to her medical treatment. Provided that both parents have 
parental responsibility, each would normally be able to give a valid consent to their child’s treatment without consulting the 
other. For certain treatments, including non-therapeutic male circumcision and vaccination, if those with parental 
responsibility cannot agree, the court will make the decision in the child’s best interests: Re B and G (children) (care proceedings) 
[2015] EWFC 3; F v F (MMR Vaccine) [2013] EWHC 2683 (Fam). 
34 Children Act 1989 section 1(1). 
35 The NHS Trust v A (a child) [2007] EWHC 1696 (Fam). 
36 Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Thomas [2018] EWHC 127 (Fam). 
37 See, for example, Yates and Gard v Great Ormond Street Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 410. 
38 per Lord Donaldson MR in Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1991] 2 WLR 140. 
39 See, for example, An NHS Trust v B [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam); Re K (A Minor) [2006] EWHC 1007 (Fam); NHS Trust v 
Baby X [2012] EWHC 2188 (Fam); Re A (HR) [2016] EWCA Civ 759; Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates [2017] EWCA Civ 
410; Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Thomas [2018] EWHC 127 (Fam). 
40 See further A Morris ‘Selective Treatment of Irreversibly Impaired Infants: Decision-Making at the Threshold’ (2009) 17 
Medical Law Review 347-376. 
41 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001] Fam 147. 
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inclined to go to court to resolve questions over the treatment, or non-treatment of babies born very 
prematurely.42 
How then are best interests decisions made in the NICU? Interestingly, there would appear to be 
some internal inconsistency within the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH)’s 
guidance on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment for children. In its preface, it is clear 
that ‘it describes situations in which individual children should be spared inappropriate invasive 
procedures—NOT types of children to whom appropriate procedures should be denied’.43 The guidance 
also makes it clear that the RCPCH’s ethics and law committee does ‘not believe that decisions about 
who is offered intensive care should be motivated by resource constraints, but should be determined by 
whether such care was appropriate for that particular child at that time’.44 According to this guidance, it 
may be appropriate to withdraw life-sustaining treatment either when ‘such treatment would be 
medically inappropriate and could not achieve its intended purpose of preserving life or restoring 
health’, or when ‘treatment would no longer be in the best interests of the child in that its burdens 
outweigh the benefits’.45  
But while the RCPH’s guidance suggests that decisions to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging 
treatment must be based upon the individual child’s prognosis, with or without treatment, when 
discussing very premature babies, the guidance appears to suggest that it will sometimes be appropriate 
to base decisions to withhold treatment upon the newborn baby’s gestational age:  
Neonates should almost always be resuscitated in the labour ward, unless there is a clear decision to do 
otherwise made with the consent of parents and based on appropriate guidelines.46 
According to the footnotes, the ‘appropriate guidelines’ to which this refers are those set out in the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ 2006 report, Critical care decisions in fetal and neonatal medicine,47 and in 
Andrew Wilkinson et al’s 2009 ‘framework for clinical practice’.48  Wilkinson et al’s framework mirrors 
the Nuffield Council’s proposed scheme for the resuscitation of premature babies, which 
recommended no resuscitation for babies born earlier than 23 weeks: ‘If gestational age is certain and 
less than 23+0 (ie 22 weeks), it would be considered in the best interests of the baby, and standard 
practice, for resuscitation not to be carried out’.49 This recommendation was based upon the findings 
                                                 
42 The reasons for this are worthy of further empirical investigation, but there are comparatively few empirical studies of 
decision-making in the NICU. For a notable exception, see HE McHaffie, et al, ‘Deciding for imperilled newborns: medical 
authority or parental autonomy?’ (2001) 27 Journal of Medical Ethics 104-109. 
43 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, Making decisions to limit treatment in life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in 
children: a framework for practice (RCPCH, 2015) (emphases in original). 
44 Ibid, para 3.3.3. 
45 Ibid, para 2.4.8. 
46 Ibid, para 3.1.2 (our emphasis). 
47 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical care decisions in fetal and neonatal medicine: ethical issues (NCOB, 2006). 
48 AR Wilkinson et al, ‘Management of babies born extremely preterm at less than 26 weeks of gestation: a framework for 




of EPICure 2,50 which, as we saw earlier, have been supplanted by more recent evidence. While the 
RCPCH guidance makes it clear that ‘In acute situations it is usually necessary to give LST [life-
sustaining treatment] first and to review the decision to continue when enough information is 
available, taking into account more experienced clinical opinion, the evolution of the clinical state, or 
the results of investigations’,51 it simultaneously cross-refers to guidelines which recommend the 
blanket non-treatment of babies born earlier than 23 weeks. 
The Nuffield Council’s report specifically recommended that ‘should professional bodies choose 
to produce guidelines for instituting intensive care, these should be reviewed regularly and revised to 
reflect any changes in outcomes for extremely premature babies.52 Given recent improvements in 
survival rates for babies born at 22 and 23 weeks, these guidelines are, at the very least, in need of some 
updating. We would, go further, however, and suggest that gestational-age based thresholds for 
resuscitation are inherently problematic. 
Guidelines for the treatment of premature babies based upon gestational age are, as Hendriks 
and Lantos point out, undoubtedly well-intentioned.53 Decisions to withhold life-sustaining treatment in 
the NICU are complex and difficult: ‘The parents are stressed, the prognosis is uncertain, the treatment 
is expensive and burdensome, and the consequences of being wrong can be tragic’.54 Gestational-age 
based guidelines enable decisions to be taken quickly, and may make these life and death decisions less 
morally burdensome. The question for the clinician is not then: ‘should I save this baby?’, but becomes 
the less fraught one: ‘what is the gestational age of this baby?’; with the decision to treat, or not, flowing 
automatically from a neutral finding of fact.  
There are, however, three reasons for challenging the use of gestational age thresholds for the 
provision of life-sustaining medical treatment. First, it is almost impossible to establish gestational age 
precisely, unless the pregnancy resulted from IVF, when the date of the embryo transfer is known. 
Otherwise, gestation is estimated through a combination of the date of the woman’s last menstrual 
period and evidence from the pregnancy-dating ultrasound scan. Because there is a margin of error of a 
week or two,55 a child born at an estimated gestational age of 23 weeks might, in fact, be as young as 21, 
or as old as 25 weeks.56 Parents may be surprised that a child they had assumed was old enough to be 
viable is in fact not, or vice-versa.  Given this inevitable uncertainty, and the life-and-death implications 
                                                 
50 Costeloe et al (n 1). 
51 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (n 43) para 3.1.2. 
52 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (n 47) para 9.17. 
53 Hendriks and Lantos (n 14). 
54 Ibid 
55 JD Lantos, The Lazarus Case: Life and Death Issues in Neonatal Intensive Care (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP, 2001), 76. 
56 Hendriks and Lantos (n 14). 
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for children, many neonatologists now argue that doctors should base their decisions on the patient in 
front of them, and not ‘fetishize’ gestational age as a surrogate for best interests decision-making.57 
 Secondly, aside from the question of how accurately gestation can be dated, the implication of 
determining that treatment should not be provided to babies born at 22 or 23 weeks’ gestation is that 
treatment in such cases is futile. This claim is hard to sustain, however, in the light of evidence that at 
(approximately) 22 weeks’ gestation, and with intensive care, between 5 and 32 per cent of babies will 
survive.58 For babies born at 22 and 23 weeks, with interventions, between 20 and 70 per cent will 
survive.59 Of course, an individual infant’s prognosis might be better or worse, but it would be 
impossible to categorise the treatment of all babies born at 22 and 23 weeks’ gestation as futile. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that extremely preterm and hence low birth weight infants often 
overcome their early disadvantages. In their comparison between extremely low birthweight infants and 
normal birthweight infants once they had reached young adulthood, Saigal et al found no significant 
differences in educational attainment, employment status and living independently.60 Dupont-Thibedeau 
et al point out that: 
the long-term outcomes of ELGANs [extremely low gestational age neonates] are in many ways superior (or 
at least equivalent) to those of Down syndrome children. It is rare for an ELGAN to have cognitive 
impairments in the long term as marked as those that are common for children with Down syndrome’.61  
Yet it is unimaginable that anyone would argue that all babies born with Down’s syndrome should be 
allowed to die because of the costs of treating them, and meeting their special educational needs in the 
future.  
Keith Barrington has recently pointed out that neonatal outcome studies have had an 
‘unfortunate’ tendency to focus upon ‘disability-free survival’. This is unfortunate, according to 
Barrington because it conflates death and disability, which, he argues are both important, but ‘should be 
considered separately, not lumped together as if they had equivalent impact, or were treated and valued 
the same by families.’  In particular, ‘disability’ in the context of long-term outcome studies for 
premature babies usually means low scores on developmental screening tests, and not the presence of a 
disabling condition. Barrington notes that that ‘…most extremely preterm babies who survive do so 
                                                 
57 K Gallagher et al ‘The attitudes of neonatologists towards extremely preterm infants:  a Q methodological study’ (2016) 
101 Archives of Disease in Childhood - Fetal and Neonatal Edition 31-36. 
58 D Austeng et al, ‘Incidence of and risk factors for neonatal morbidity after active perinatal care: extremely preterm infants 
study in Sweden (EXPRESS)’ (2010) 99 Acta Paediatrica 978-992. 
59 Rysavy et al (n 2). 
60 S Saigal et al, ‘Transition of Extremely Low-Birth-Weight Infants From Adolescence to Young Adulthood: Comparison 
With Normal Birth-Weight Controls’ (2006) 295 JAMA 667-675.  
61 A Dupont-Thibodeau et al, ‘End-of-life decisions for extremely low-gestational-age infants: Why simple rules for 
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without serious impairment, even those who really do have serious impairments have a good quality of 
life, and there is little impact of gestational age at birth on the frequency of impairment.’62   
Two years ago, Annie Janvier and John Lantos published a trenchant critique of basing treatment 
decisions in the delivery room upon gestational age:63   
There are three common arguments against the treatment of extremely preterm neonates.  First, it is seen as 
futile.  Second, it is seen as too expensive.  Third, it is thought that the majority of survivors are disabled.  
The medical literature does not support any of these arguments. Treatment of neonates born at 22 and 23 
weeks is clearly not futile:  with interventions 20%-70% of such babies survive.  No other treatment with 
such survival rates or long-term outcomes would be called futile.64  
This led them to ask the following ethical question, which is worth quoting at length: 
Are similar policies applied to other groups of patients?  In our view, it makes sense to allocate healthcare 
resources in a way that maximises good and minimises bad outcomes, but the standards for making 
allocation decisions should be applied fairly to different groups of patients.  Policies that limit treatment for 
babies born at lower gestations but do not limit treatment for patients with even worse outcomes – for 
example, patients with advanced cancer… -- are policies that unfairly deny interventions to one group of 
patients even though that group has outcomes that are demonstrably better than other groups.65 
Janvier and Lantos acknowledge the expense of long NICU stays, and the higher rates of disabilities 
among extremely preterm survivors, compared with babies born close to, or at term.  However, they 
point out the relevant comparator should instead be babies born just above the treatment cut-off point.  
That is, it does not make sense to compare the outcomes for babies born at roughly 23 weeks with those 
of babies born at term, rather an appropriate comparator would be babies born after approximately 24 
or 25 weeks, for whom treatment is not generally controversial.66  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the reliance on gestational age as a marker for prognosis 
fails to capture what may be the most distinctive feature of decision-making for extremely premature 
babies, namely that immediately after birth, their prognosis is usually both unknown and unknowable.67 
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When a baby is born alive at 22 or 23 weeks, it is impossible to tell whether she will thrive in the future, 
or die soon after birth. As Lantos and Meadow have explained, when resuscitation takes place,  
nearly all of these babies are in a situation of radical prognostic uncertainty.  Doctors cannot say what the 
outcome for any particular baby will be.  Instead, the range of possibilities covers the spectrum of 
outcomes, from the very best to the very worst.68 
Prematurity is, in Lantos and Meadow’s words, ‘both an acute crisis and a chronic condition.’69 Decision-
making about the treatment of extremely premature babies in the NICU is not a matter of making one 
treatment decision about one condition (or known complex of conditions).  Instead, it can be broken 
down into two classes or kinds of decisions:  first, the decision to resuscitate in the ‘acute crisis’; and 
then, the multitude of decisions to provide or continue care for the ‘chronic condition’. Importantly, 
these decisions often have to be made when doctors are unable to make any predictions about the 
child’s short or long-term prognosis.  
Unlike other interventions in acute illnesses, in the NICU there is rarely one moment, or one 
decision, in which a practice or decision can be equally predictably therapeutically beneficial across a 
cohort of children. Even when considering children born at the same gestational age, treatment 
decisions and possible outcomes are profoundly specific. This understanding of particularity is at the 
heart of decision-making in the NICU.70 Multiple variables affect a baby’s chances of survival, including 
but not limited to her birthweight, race, gender, whether she was delivered by caeasarean section and 
whether her mother took steroids before delivery.71 When deciding whether to spend money on the 
treatment of very premature babies, it is vital to recognize the profound specificity of treatment options 
and outcomes for children born at the same gestational age.   
In many cases, the child’s ‘radical prognostic uncertainty’ predates her birth and forms the 
backdrop to interventions during high risk pregnancies. There are a number of known risk factors for 
very preterm delivery including IVF/ICSI;72 twin or higher order multiple pregnancies;73 maternal youth 
or advanced age; maternal race,74 and conditions like type 1 diabetes and pre-eclampsia.75 Some women 
will experience sudden placental abruption or other bleeding or infection that results in premature 
delivery. While some parents will be shocked by the preterm delivery of an otherwise healthy pregnancy, 
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others will have been counselled in advance about the risks of premature delivery, and their prenatal care 
will be designed to ensure that the pregnancy is maintained for as long as possible, and that, after birth, 
the baby will have the best chance of survival.76 It almost goes without saying that, before delivery, the 
future costs of a premature infant’s life do not dictate the standard of care that a woman receives in 
pregnancy.  
It is, however, evident that policies which use a baby’s gestational age in order to determine 
whether to provide life-sustaining treatment may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.77 If treatment is not 
provided to babies born at 22 weeks, survival rates at this estimated gestational age will obviously be 
very low indeed. Moreover, as Hendriks and Lantos point out, if a woman goes into labour after 22 
weeks of pregnancy and is told that her baby will not be resuscitated, this is likely to shape decisions 
about her obstetric care. If she has been told that her baby is not going to be treated, there may be little 
point in her taking steroids or undergoing caesarean delivery, without which her baby’s survival becomes 
much less likely.78 
A much better predictor of long-term survival than gestational age is, in fact, short-term survival. 
As John Lantos explains, ‘the chance that any particular baby will ultimately survive increases 
enormously with each day that they actually do survive’.79 Crucially, this is independent of birthweight: 
‘any baby, regardless of birthweight, who has been in the NICU for three days and is still alive has a 
nearly 90 per cent chance of survival’.80 After four days’ survival, birthweight is no longer relevant, and a 
baby born at 600 grams has the same chance of long-term survival as a four day old baby who was born 
at 1600 grams.81 ‘Response to therapy’, or waiting for babies to ‘declare themselves’,82 therefore 
becomes, in itself, a prognostic test, but one that works only if all newborn babies receive life-sustaining 
treatment.  
 Waiting for the baby to ‘declare herself’ as a test for whether or not treatment should continue to 
be provided has the advantage of simplicity, and it might also be easier for doctors and parents since 
they are not, on this view, making life and death decisions, but waiting for the baby to elect to live or die. 
Of course, there are also potential costs to this approach. For the babies who do not survive, they may 
have been subjected to four days of burdensome treatment, which turns out also to have been futile, and 
not in their best interests. And while in most cases, these ‘declarations’ are fairly reliable predictors of 
long-term survival, in a minority of cases, they are not. 
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New software which captures and processes patient data, across multiple measures, in real time 
may provide more accurate prognoses in the future. Interestingly, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and 
Kenneth Cukier point out how a system developed by a Canadian researcher which tracked 16 different 
data streams, such as heart rate, respiration rate and blood oxygen levels, resulted in the surprising 
conclusion that ‘very constant vital signs’ among premature babies appeared to correlate with the 
underlying presence of a serious infection.83 Stability was not a sign of improvement therefore, but, as 
Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier  put it, ‘the calm before the storm - as if the baby’s body is telling its tiny 
organs to batten down the hatches for a rough ride ahead’.84  
What is clear, however, is that given inevitable uncertainty as to prognosis in the NICU, 
treatment decisions have to be taken incrementally, one-by-one, as more information about the baby’s 
condition becomes available. Of course, this does not mean that treatment will always be in a child’s best 
interests. Non-treatment decisions, taken in the best interests of the child, are always likely to be 
common in the NICU.85 In one study in a London NICU, 40 per cent of deaths were the result of the 
withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment, 15 per cent followed a ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ decision, and 3 per 
cent were the result of withholding life-prolonging treatment; a minority of deaths (42 per cent) were 
described as ‘natural’.86 If continued treatment would be futile or burdensome, it may be in the child’s 
best interests to receive comfort care only, and to be allowed to die peacefully. But this has to be an 
individual decision, grounded in consideration of the child’s best interests, rather than because she fits 
into a category which has been pre-labelled as ‘too expensive to treat’. As we have seen, some children 
born at an early gestational age will thrive, while others will not. To withhold treatment from a group 
with an uncertain prognosis, on the grounds that some members of that group are likely to be disabled 
and/or expensive to care for, even though we know some others are not, is to fail to treat each 
individual child as a person to whom individual duties are owed.  
In many parents’ highly medically-managed journey to the NICU, the costs of premature babies 
only tend to be discussed at the most dramatic point in the process, when the newborn infant is 
surrounded by high-tech machinery. If there are concerns about the costs of extreme prematurity, this is 
certainly not the first or the most useful point to intervene. Reducing the number of high-risk 
pregnancies would represent a more economically efficient intervention, and it would not be attended by 
the psychological and emotional costs to parents. While the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
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Authority has been successful in reducing the multiple pregnancy rate in the UK,87 women who travel 
overseas for cheaper IVF treatment, as a result of inadequate NHS funding for fertility services, may 
return to the UK pregnant with twins, triplets or quads, when the risk of extreme prematurity will be 
very high.88 Better funding for fertility treatment in the UK might, in fact, reduce the economic burden 
of extreme prematurity, but this is not generally the conclusion drawn by commentators worried about 
the costs of babies born at the margins of viability. 
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IV THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BIRTH 
 
The implication of the claim that non-treatment decisions should be taken for a whole category of 
children – such as those born at 22 or 23 weeks – rather than on an individual best interests basis is that 
the ordinary obligations of clinicians and parents do not apply in the normal way within the NICU. One 
possible explanation for treating extremely premature babies differently from other children might lie in 
the claim made by some philosophers and ethicists that birth is an arbitrary cut-off point for the 
acquisition of moral status.89  
LW Sumner, for example, has argued that ‘Birth is a shallow and arbitrary criterion of moral 
standing’,90 on the grounds that newborn infants and fetuses have ‘the same size, shape, internal 
constitution, species membership, capacities, level of consciousness, and so forth’.91  Similarly, Helga 
Kuhse and Peter Singer maintain that while the moment of birth is ‘clear and precise’, it ‘is not really 
crucial from the point of view of the moral status of the foetus or infant’.92 And Jeff McMahan has said 
that ‘it may be difficult to see how birth, which involves only a change in the fetus’s location, could 
significantly affect the fetus-cum-infant’s moral status, which ought instead to be determined entirely by 
its intrinsic properties’.93  
If there is no ‘intrinsic’ difference, and hence no change in moral status, between a fetus of 23 
weeks’ gestation, which can, in theory at least, be aborted lawfully under the so-called ‘social ground’ in 
the UK,94 and a newborn baby, born after 23 weeks’ gestation, does this mean that it could be legitimate 
to kill the newborn baby at her mother’s request? This is the controversial conclusion of Alberto 
Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, who argue in favour of what they call ‘after-birth’ abortion on the 
grounds that it is impossible to harm a newborn baby: 
If a potential person, like a fetus and a newborn, does not become an actual person, like you and us, then 
there is neither an actual nor a future person who can be harmed, which means that there is no harm at all. 
So, if you ask one of us if we would have been harmed, had our parents decided to kill us when we were 
fetuses or newborns, our answer is ‘no’, because they would have harmed someone who does not exist (the 
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‘us’ whom you are asking the question), which means no one. And if no one is harmed, then no harm 
occurred.95 
Michael Tooley, while questioning Giubilini and Minerva’s conclusions, agrees with them that 
‘the crucial issue here … is at what point a developing human acquires the capacity for thought’.96 And 
Tooley himself has argued that to have a strong right to life, an entity must be capable of desiring its 
own continued existence, thus ruling out newborn babies.97 Derek Parfit, similarly, maintains that ‘to be 
a person, a being must be self-conscious, aware of its identity and its continued existence over time’.98 
These sorts of arguments rest upon the idea that the moral status of an organism – a fetus or a 
newborn baby – depends upon its inherent characteristics, such as its capacity for thought or its ability 
to value its own existence. If a baby born at 23 weeks has the same inherent characteristics as a fetus at 
23 weeks, it has been suggested that its moral status, and hence the duties owed to it, are the same. For 
four reasons, however, this argument, and its implication for the treatment of premature babies, is 
problematic. 
First, the fetus does not exist as an independent entity, whose characteristics can be measured 
and compared with those of a newborn baby. A live fetus is necessarily inside a woman’s body, and 
wholly dependent upon her body to sustain its life. This is not ‘just’ a question of location, or, according 
to Raanan Gillon, ‘biological geography’,99 rather it is what the fetus is. During pregnancy, a fetus is a 
part of the woman’s body; after birth, a baby is no longer a part of someone else, but is an individual 
with a separate existence in the world. Before birth, in Mary Anne Warren’s words, ‘It is impossible to 
treat fetuses in utero as if they were persons without treating women as if they were something less than 
persons’.100 As Kate Greasley explains, it is only after birth that a baby has interests that can be protected 
independently: 
The fetus is, in important ways, set apart from the world of common humanity. It is only upon emergence 
into that common world at birth that other humans can fully treat it as a fellow person—can directly see it, 
touch it, speak to it, assess and respond to its needs or confer benefits upon it, without going through the 
body of the pregnant woman.101 
Secondly, it is not true that there are no intrinsic as well as extrinsic changes in a baby when it is 
born alive. Birth involves significant intrinsic changes in the newborn baby. According to Noah Hillman 
et al, ‘The transition from foetus to neonate is the most complex physiologic adaptation that occurs in 
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human experience’.102 Here Achas Burin sets out just some of the physiological changes that take place 
when a baby is born prematurely: 
all the neonate’s organ systems are involved in birth. With hormonal support, the lungs inflate, circulation is 
redirected, and the digestive system becomes active. There are also profound changes in hormonal function, 
metabolism, and temperature regulation. The lungs are emptied of foetal fluid and lubricants secreted to 
facilitate expansion so breathing can begin. … The volume of blood pumped from the heart nearly doubles. 
There are also major structural changes to the circulatory system. Before birth, oxygen is supplied by the 
placenta, so blood flows from the right to left atrium of the heart without passing the lungs. Following 
birth, the ducts that enabled this to happen close permanently.103 
The ‘extrinsic’ difference of location also has a fundamental impact upon the developing brain, and it is 
only through interaction with the outside world that consciousness becomes possible.104 For the 
newborn baby, birth represents  ‘a quantum leap forward’ in establishing social bonds,105 and becoming, 
as Mary Ann Warren puts it, ‘a social being’:  
The infant at birth enters the human social world, where, if it lives, it becomes involved in social 
relationships with others, of kinds that can only be dimly foreshadowed before birth. It begins to be known 
and cared for, not just as a potential member of the family or community, but as a socially present and 
responsive individual.106  
Thirdly, the claim that personhood is acquired only sometime after birth raises practical 
difficulties. If a person comes into being during childhood, rather than at birth, when does this 
significant change takes place – at one month, six months, one year or two years of age? Any age-based 
norm would necessarily be arbitrary, and in tension with a factual criterion for personhood, grounded in 
the capacity for rational thought. As Jeff McMahan explains:  
There is no discernable event in human development that is momentous enough for us to point to it and 
say, ‘Now that individual is worthy of respect’, it simply does not happen that a child goes to bed one night 
as a being below the threshold only to wake the next morning sufficiently altered to be worthy of respect.107 
A factual test for personhood acquired during childhood would have to vary for different 
children, depending upon their cognitive abilities. Not only would this be impossibly vague as a guide to 
how an individual child should be treated, but also it might mean that there are human beings who never 
become persons. If non-personhood could be a status that endures throughout someone’s life, how 
should these human non-persons be treated, and what obligations would they be owed? For those who 
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hold to the ‘intrinsic properties’ view of personhood, birth’s legal significance may be a legal fiction, but 
it is, as Mary Anne Warren suggests, ‘a fiction that we would have difficulty doing without’.108 
Fourthly, while debates about the moral status of fetuses and newborns are likely to continue, the 
legal position could not be clearer. Legal personhood is acquired when a child is born alive, and has an 
existence separate from her mother.109 When a woman makes a decision to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy, the fetus is not yet a separate legal person with rights of its own. Once a child is born, 
however, unless or until she is formally adopted, the choice not to be a parent has ceased to exist; the 
child is now a separate legal person to whom clinicians owe a duty of care, and whose parents have 
acquired duties of support and responsibility for her. Since the law considers a new legal person to exist 
once a child is born alive, and has an existence separate from her mother, premature babies undoubtedly 
qualify. And as a legal person, a premature baby acquires the rights to which other legal persons are 
entitled.  
The evidence given in the 1981 trial of Dr Leonard Arthur for the murder of a child with 
Down’s syndrome (in whose notes he had written ‘Parents do not wish the baby to survive. Nursing care 
only’, before prescribing an opiate painkiller), suggested that, 37 years ago, there were some doctors who 
believed that it was legitimate to treat the parental and clinical obligation to care for a child with special 
needs as effectively optional.110 The then President of the Royal College of Physicians, Professor 
Douglas Black, had told the court: ‘I say that it is ethical, in the case of a child suffering from Down’s, 
and with a parental wish that it should not survive, to terminate life providing other considerations are 
taken into account such as the status and ability of the parents to cope in a way that the child could 
otherwise have had a happy life’. Dr Arthur was acquitted, following ‘the virtual collapse of the 
prosecution evidence’,111 and Farquharson J’s controversial direction to the jury,112 but even in 1981, this 
case is best regarded as an anomaly.113 In a case decided the same year, the Court of Appeal firmly 
rejected the parents’ view that life-saving treatment should not be provided to a baby with Down’s 
syndrome,114 on the grounds that life with Down’s syndrome was not ‘demonstrably going to be so 
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awful that in effect the child must be condemned to die’.115 In 2018, it is axiomatic that parental 
reluctance to care for a disabled baby is not grounds for withholding treatment from a child.116  
It is, of course, true that in some other cultures, infanticide was practised regularly and with 
impunity, 117 but this does not establish some essential truth about the value of early human life. Insofar 
as infanticide continues to be treated as a lesser criminal offence,118 it could be argued that this is more 
plausibly grounded in an understanding of post-partum psychosis and its implications for the mens rea of 
murder, rather than because the killing of newborn babies is sanctioned by society. In legal terms at least, 
it is clear that once a child is born, she becomes a person to whom duties of care are owed, and her best 
interests, judged on an individual case-by-case basis, are the paramount consideration when making 





Evidence of a reduction in the age of viability has also been invoked in order to question the abortion 
time limit of 24 weeks (for abortions carried out on the grounds that the mother’s health would be more 
at risk from carrying the pregnancy to term than it would be from termination).119 In the UK, until 1990, 
the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 had indirectly created a viability-linked time limit for abortion, 
which in 1990 was assumed to be 24 weeks. Since 1990, a 24 week time limit has appeared on the face of 
the statute, but given evidence that some babies can survive at 22 or 23 weeks, some commentators have 
questioned its sustainability.120 
 The question of abortion time limits is outside the scope of this article, but it is worth pointing 
out that it sits uneasily with concern about the costs of extremely premature babies. If survival at 23 
weeks is judged too expensive, it is, to say the least, peculiar to suggest that a woman might be prevented 
from terminating a pregnancy at 23 weeks because, if born at that age a baby could survive, but in 
practice would not do so, since the costs of saving it would be too great. Indeed, if economic rationality 
were to be the driver of all decisions about fetal survival, it could be argued that instead of reducing the 
time limit, fewer obstacles should be placed in the way of women seeking abortions because a 
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termination will almost always cost less than the delivery of a child, and infinitely less than the costs of 
her upbringing.  
Our point in this article is not to intervene in debates over abortion time limits, however. Nor is 
it to argue that life-prolonging treatment should never be withheld or withdrawn in the NICU. Rather, 
we are making the more modest and at first sight uncontroversial claim that non-treatment decisions in 
the NICU should be taken in the same way as they are for other children receiving life-prolonging 
treatment, on the basis of what treatment, if any, is in the child’s best interests. In these individual ‘life 
and death’ decisions, what is relevant is the benefits and burdens of treatment for the child herself. What 
is not relevant is speculation about the costs of the child’s special needs in the future. 
 But while we maintain that the costs of a child’s future care are not relevant when deciding 
whether he or she should be allowed to live, there are some special features of the NICU that should be 
taken into account when thinking about how treatment decisions are made for extremely premature 
babies. Parents who are traumatised and in shock after a very premature birth may find themselves 
suddenly and unexpectedly faced with difficult medical decisions, often in conditions of radical 
uncertainty, when the child’s prognosis is simply unknowable.121 In such circumstances, parents need 
help, support and compassion.122 As Annie Janvier and John Lantos explain: 
Parents are grieving the loss of their hope for a healthy pregnancy, delivery, and term newborn. The 
sickness of their child is preceded immediately by pregnancy and the major impact that a high-risk delivery 
entails. … Furthermore, most of the babies in the NICU depend on life sustaining interventions, making 
bonding more complex. This bonding may be complicated by the fact that many parents do not know how 
much time they will have with their child, whether minutes, days, weeks, or years.123 
The medical literature has evaluated the negative effects of the NICU on parent-child bonding, 
concluding that the risks to attachment are significant, but that they can be mitigated through practices 
like encouraging skin-on-skin contact.124 The early work on parent-child bonding came from NICU 
nurses rather than doctors,125 and nurses play a key role in decision-making in the NICU.  The 
relationships between parents, doctors and children are managed and navigated by the ‘primaries’ or 
specific nurses assigned to each child upon admission.  Increasingly, among the many experts working in 
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the NICU are parent liaison officers and organizations and charities like Bliss and Fragile Beginnings, 
which help to support bonding between the premature newborn and her parents, and which help 
healthcare professionals to translate the medicalised language of the NICU into family-orientated 
discourses of new parenthood.126 
What emerges is a growing understanding that despite the unfamiliar technology, parents 
experience the NICU as more than a high-tech, medicalised space. A rich seam of NICU memoires 
demonstrate the family construction that happens among the blue light and the ‘space age’ machines, in 
which parents become intensely emotionally invested in their children.127 There is evidence that a model 
of shared decision-making is particularly helpful for parents, who want to be involved, but are grateful to 
be able to share decision-making responsibility with clinicians.128 It is clear that parents in the NICU not 
only value empathetic and compassionate communication from staff, but also appreciate being involved 
in minor parental choices and decisions about the daily care of their child.129  
Indeed, there is growing evidence of the benefits of what is described as family-integrated care in 
the NICU, for both parents and babies.130 In family-integrated care, as Chris Gale explains, 
Parents are resident in the neonatal intensive care unit for extended periods, learn to provide all care (except 
intravenous fluid and medications), record observations in medical charts, and participate in ward rounds, 
with their involvement underpinned by peer support and education.131 
In a multi-centre, cluster randomised controlled trial of family-integrated care, O’Brien et al found that it 
‘improved infant weight gain, decreased parent stress and anxiety, and increased high-frequency 
exclusive breastmilk feeding at discharge’.132 If, as we suggest, the claim that extremely premature babies 
are too expensive to treat relies upon the construction of the NICU as a space in which children are not 
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really children, and, as a result, parents are not really parents, it is not only inaccurate and unhelpful, but 
also profoundly at odds with best practice in the NICU. 
 
 
 
